Kant’s Theory of Inductive Reasoning: The reflecting power of judgment in Kant’s Logic

Por • 19 mar, 2021 • Sección: Crítica

Matthew McAndrew

In this essay, I attempt to answer an important question about Kant’s Logic. 1 This is the logic textbook that was published under Kant’s name toward the end of his life.2 It addresses Kant’s distinction between the determining and reflecting powers of judgment.3 However, this topic is not included in the chapter that is devoted to judgment, as we might expect. Instead, it is found in the following chapter, which is concerned with inferences.4 I explain why this is so. To my knowledge, this question has yet to be addressed by the existing scholarship on Kant’s logic.5 However, it is certainly an important question because it bears on Kant’s conception of the reflecting power of judgment. We ought to understand the significance of the fact that the Logic addresses the power of judgment in the context of inferences, rather than judgments.

Matthew McAndrew, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA

Matthew McAndrew, Kant’s Theory of Inductive Reasoning: The reflecting power of judgment in Kant’s Logic, KSO 2014: 43-64. Posted March 29, 2014 www.kantstudiesonline.net © 2014 Matthew McAndrew & Kant Studies Online Ltd

https://kantstudiesonline.net/uploads/files/McAndrew00214.pdf

 

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