Modern attempts to understand light go back to Newton who considered light to be particles, the so called corpuscular theory, and the other school of Huygens, Young and others. Huygens and Young viewpoint emphasised the wave property. This difference of opinions persisted for close to two centuries till Maxwell theory solidly established light as a wave phenomenon associated with Electromagnetism. A serious schism so to speak was introduced into the theory of light with the understanding of “Light gas”, the so called Black Body radiation. Einstein’s photon hypothesis and Bose’s successful derivation of the Planck spectrum put the corpuscular theory back in place, while classical description continues to be used as well.

Esta reflexión rehúnde sus raíces en la tensión original de la conciencia con su correlato, esto es, de la conciencia como conciencia de algo. Sobre este pilar de la fenomenología husserliana, Sartre construye las estructuras del para-sí que, en la segunda y en la tercera parte de El ser y la nada, enmarcan esa tensión entre la nada humana como para-sí y el en-sí como ser macizo. Esa conciencia, por tanto, pasará a ser una conciencia de nada como conciencia refleja, permitiendo que se instaure en esa relación ontológica con el ser una ausencia en la comprensión total de la condición humana.

In this article, I discuss Alain Badiou’s 2008 address titled “The Three Negations.” Though the text was originally presented in a symposium concerning the relationship of law to Badiou’s theory of the event, I discuss the way this brief address offers an introduction to the broad sweep of Badiou’s metaphysics, outlining his accounts of being, appearing, and transformation. To do so, Badiou calls on the resources of three paradigms of negation: from classical Aristotelian logic, from Brouwer’s intuitionist logic, and in paraconsistent logics developed by DaCosta.

Do scientific theories limit human knowledge? In other words, are there physical variables hidden by essence forever? We argue for negative answers and illustrate our point on chaotic classical dynamical systems. We emphasize parallels with quantum theory and conclude that the common real numbers are, de facto, the hidden variables of classical physics. Consequently, real numbers should not be considered as “physically real” and classical mechanics, like quantum physics, is indeterministic.

We discuss the connections between the failure of the axiom of choice in set theory, and certain model-theoretic structures with enough symmetry.

This is a study of S. Kripke’s notion of fulfilment. Motivated by Paris-Harrington statement, Kripke was looking for a proof of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem which was model-theoretic, natural (without self-reference), and easy. Fulfilment gives a versatile tool for both Proof and Model Theory. We begin with short proofs to a number of classical results. With two new results: there is an easily definable subring R of the primitive recursive functions such that for any non-principal ultrafilter D on ω, R/D is a recursively saturated model of Peano arithmetic; and for any r.e. theory T and for any given r.e. set, we can feasibly find a Σ01 formula which semi-represents it in T. We then give a version of Herbrand’s Theorem, and of the Hilbert-Ackermann method of proving consistency

This article aims to develop a new account of scientific explanation for computer simulations. To this end, two questions are answered: what is the explanatory relation for computer simulations? and what kind of epistemic gain should be expected? For several reasons tailored to the benefits and needs of computer simulations, these questions are better answered within the unificationist model of scientific explanation. Unlike previous efforts in the literature, I submit that the explanatory relation is between the simulation model and the results of the simulation. I also argue that our epistemic gain goes beyond the unificationist account, encompassing a practical dimension as well.

The purpose of this essay is to trace the historical development of geometry while focusing on how we acquired mathematical tools for describing the “shape of the universe.” More specifically, our aim is to consider, without a claim to completeness, the origin of Riemannian geometry, which is indispensable to the description of the space of the universe as a “generalized curved space.”

We study a dynamic game in which information arrives gradually as long as a principal funds research, and an agent takes an action in each period. In equilibrium, the principal’s patience is the key determinant of her information provision: the lower her discount rate, the more eagerly she funds. When she is sufficiently patient, her information provision and value function are well-approximated by the ‘Bayesian persuasion’ model. If the conflict of interest is purely belief-based and information is valuable, then she provides full information if she is patient.

The concept of the physical state of a system is ubiquitous in physics but is usually presented in terms of specific cases. For example, the state of a point particle of mass m is completely characterized by its position and momentum. There is a tendency to consider such states as “real”, i.e., as physical properties of a system. This rarely causes problems in classical physics but the notion of real quantum states has contributed mightily to the philosophical conundrums associated with quantum mechanics. The Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky paradox is a prime example. In fact, quantum states are not physical properties of a system but rather subjective descriptions that depend on the information available to a particular observer.