El tema del presente artículo es la recepción y radicalización heideggeriana de la aporía del tiempo y el alma en Aristóteles en los textos del periodo conocido como la década fenomenológica. La cuestión acerca de si habría o no tiempo en caso de que no existiera el alma (al final de Physica ∆14) conduce a una difícil aporía que queda sin respuesta en el corpus aristotelicum. Heidegger piensa que el planteamiento aporético muestra que Aristóteles intuye ya (si bien no llega a ver con total claridad) que el Dasein mismo debe considerarse fundamentalmente tiempo. Puesto que el tiempo es la determinación básica de la existencia humana, el Dasein sería imposible sin el tiempo. En otras palabras, no habría Dasein sin tiempo.

Meillassoux defines “correlationism” as the view that we can only access the mutual dependence of thought and being—specifically, subjectivity and objectivity—which he attributes to Heidegger. This attribution is inapt. It is only by accessing being—via existential analysis—that we can properly distinguish beings like subjects and objects. I propose that Meillassoux’s misattribution ignores the ontological difference that drives Heidegger’s Project.

One important factor to be considered in the process of algebrization of mathematics is the emergence of symbolic language in the seventeenth century. Focussing on three works, In Artem analyticen Isagoge (1591) by François Viète (1540-1603); Cursus Mathematicus (1634-1637-1642) by Pierre Hérigone (1580-1643) and Geometriae Speciosae Elementa (1659) by Pietro Mengoli (1626/7-1686), in this article we analyse two relevant aspects of symbolic language: the significance of the notation in the symbolic language and the role of Hérigone’s new symbolic method. This analysis allows us to better understand the role played by this circulation of ideas in the formative process of symbolic language in mathematics..

Resumen Aristóteles argumenta a favor del principio de contradicción, tomando como base la tesis enunciada en Met. Γ 4, 1006a 29-30. El problema es la dificultad de intelección y traducción de esa frase. En este trabajo, se analizan las tres versiones principales que se han dado de ella a lo largo de la historia de las traducciones de Aristóteles. Se concluye que dos de ellas son difícilmente aceptables por motivos filológicos y claramente rechazables atendiendo al contexto del discurso y a su sentido filosófico. Finalmente se propone una traducción y se esclarece el sentido de la tesis aristotélica.

Boudou and the authors have recently introduced the intuitionistic temporal logic ITL e and shown it to be decidable. In this article we show that the `henceforth’-free fragment of this logic is complete for the class of non-deterministic quasimodels introduced by Fern’andez-Duque. From this and results of Boudou, Romero and the authors, we conclude that this fragment is also complete for the standard semantics of ITL e over the class of expanding posets.

Vers une réhabilitation de l’opinion comme connaissance probable des choses contingentes. Le chapitre IX du De Interpretatione est l’un des textes les plus difficiles et les plus contestés d’Aristote. On en donnera la traduction. On en analysera l’introduction pour déterminer avec précision le problème qu’il pose : celui des futurs contingents. La solution du problème doit, selon Aristote, respecter les deux principes logiques de non-contradiction et du tiers-exclu. Elle exige, en revanche, qu’on abandonne la théorie mégarique et en particulier la définition diodoréenne du possible. La solution explicite d’Aristote tient en deux principes : il faut distinguer entre nécessité absolue et nécessité conditionnelle, il faut limiter la validité du principe de bivalence. La conception générale d’Aristote confirme la leçon du chapitre IX du De Interpretatione. Aristote a tenté, non de réformer la logique dont il venait de fixer les principes, mais de réhabiliter l’opinion comme connaissance du contingent ; une telle connaissance a valeur de probabilité.

Twice during the last fifteen years did scholars, of many callings and countries, collaborate and, by Festschrift and commemorative volume, express their appreciation of the work of ERNST CASSIRER. Since the turn of the century, in many languages and more than a hundred books, essays and articles, the thought of this great among contemporary philosophers has ranged from compendious historical investigations into the “problem of knowledge”, interpretations of culture-periods, philosophers, scientists, poets to penetrating analyses of mathematics, physics, chemistry, psychology, history, linguistics and mythology. Yet, while Cassirer achieved early fame with well-documented presentations of other men’s ideas, his own philosophy was not developed before the poblication of his Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen, the latest volume of which appeared in 1929, at a time when in Germany phenomenology and the “Lebens-philosophischen” precursors of existentialism had all but eclipsed the classicism of Cassirer’s theme and style. His philosophy proper could, therefore, neither receive the attention which a German intelligentsia gave to lesser intellectual events in the anxious pre-Hitler days; nor could an English-language audience, lacking a complete translation of his principal work, satisfy the interest in his thought which some of his (translated) books had already provoked.

En el presente artículo se abordan algunas de las principales dificultades derivadas de la interpretación del pensamiento aristotélico en el mundo contemporáneo. Se inicia con la consideración de las influencias del contexto de la Academia en el pensamiento aristotélico, incluyendo el vínculo con el referente platónico. Posteriormente, se analizan las distintas vetas de estudio aristotélico de acuerdo a los principales enfoques de sus diversos intérpretes en la historia de la filosofía occidental. En tercer orden, se realiza una revisión del concepto del no‑ser en Aristóteles, aludiendo a nuevas posibilidades de interpretación en función de su idea de límite

It is not easy to understand how a sensible object can convey a meaning. Is there something in the sensuous medium that is peculiarly capable of standing for another thing? Is the meaning conveyed in some ways independent or dependent upon the characteristics of a sensuous medium? Obviously, these questions are complex and can be approached from any number of standpoints. A promising venue of interpretation regarding the issue of how symbols symbolize and signs signify is offered by the philosophical anthropology of Ernst Cassirer. However, as excellent as this account is I believe it can be improved through a supplementation. In particular, I would suggest that Cassirer’s epistemological standpoint on symbols can be enhanced with the metaphysical standpoint of Alfred North Whitehead and Henri Bergson. The blending of these perspectives, while a difficult undertaking, provides in my view an essentially complete interpretation of the relationship between expression and representation in the process of concept formation.

Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik (DI) is one of Cassirer’s least known and studied works, despite his own assessment as “one of his most important achievements” (Gawronsky 1949, 29). A prominent theme locates quantum mechanics as a yet further step of the tendency within physical theory towards the purely functional theory of the concept and functional characterization of objectivity. In this respect DI can be considered an “update”, like the earlier monograph Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie: Erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtungen (1921), to Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff (1910), a seminal work considering only classical and pre-relativistic physics. But how does DI cohere with the three volumes of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923–29) providing a systematic survey of symbolic meanings in diverse aspects of culture