Thermodynamics has a clear arrow of time, characterized by the irreversible approach to equilibrium. This stands in contrast to the laws of microscopic theories, which are invariant under time-reversal. In this article, I show that the difficulty in solving this «problem of irreversibility» partly arises from the fact that it actually consists of five different sub-problems. These concern the source of irreversibility in thermodynamics, the definition of equilibrium and entropy, the justification of coarse-graining, the approach to equilibrium and the arrow of time.

The main purpose of this paper is to present a new approach to logic or what we will call superlogic. This approach constitutes a new way of looking at the connection between quantum mechanics and logic. It is a {it geometrisation} of the quantum logic. Note that this superlogic is not distributive reflecting a good propriety to describe quantum mechanics, non commutative spaces and contains a nilpotent element.

En la primera Sección, el artículo examina varias de las principales ideas y aportaciones lógicas de Lorenzo Peña, mostrando cómo constituye una peculiaridad de la concepción y del sistema formal propuestos por ese autor el articular la lógica paraconsistente dentro de un enfoque gradualístico de la verdad, lo cual lleva al empleo de una semántica infinivalente y tensorial y a la introducción de una serie de nuevos functores que responden al uso lingüístico, al menos idealizadamente. En la segunda parte se someten a crítica tales ideas, principalmente cuestionando el punto de vista de Lorenzo Peña sobre la relación entre lógica y ontología.

What is the proper explanation of intuitionistic hypothetical judgment, and thence propositional implication? The answer is unclear from the writings of Brouwer and Heyting, who in their lifetimes propounded multiple (sometimes conflicting) explanations of the hypothetical judgment. To my mind, the determination of an acceptable explanation must take into account its adequacy for the expression of the bar theorem and, more generally, the development of an open-ended framework for transcendental arguments in mathematics.

Two-valued logic cannot be a universally valid method of reasoning. This can be established using two-valued logic itself, under which, if it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that two-valued logic is a universally valid method of reasoning, it leads to a self-contradiction — indeed, to a paradox.

El artículo se propone tematizar algunos aspectos en torno al uso del término «fenomenología» por parte de Hegel y Heidegger. Así, el autor revisa en primer lugar la lectura que Heidegger hizo de Hegel para, en segundo lugar, matizar las diferencias. En este sentido se hace necesaria una breve introducción al uso que Hegel hace de «fenomenología» para así contrastarlo con la idea de la fenomenología en Heidegger, especialmente a partir de sus primeras lecciones en Friburgo. Con ello se presentan algunos elementos para diferenciar el sentido dialéctico y el sentido hermenéutico que puede tener la «fenomenología».

«Husserl’s work include lengthy treatment of universals, categories, meanings, numbers, manifolds, etc. from an ontological perspective. Here, however, we shall concentrate almost exclusively on the Logical Investigations, which contain in a clear form the ontological ideas which provided the terminological and theoretical basis both for much of the detailed phenomenological description and for many of the metaphysical theses presented in Husserl’s later Works.

Los ensayos reunidos en este volumen se escribieron entre 1960 y 1990 y ya han aparecido en diversos lugares de América y Europa. Carla Cordua escribió los cuatro últimos, Roberto Torretti los siete primeros. El primer y el último ensayo son de carácter general. El orden de los nueve restantes corresponde al de las tres Críticas. En conjunto darán una idea de la intrínseca variedad que Kant, antes que nadie, osó discernir en la razón humana. Aunque no hay contradicciones visibles, se podrá notar que los autores no siempre entienden los textos de Kant de la misma manera. Debido a esta circunstancia y al trascurso del tiempo, hay en el libro una variedad que tal vez no coincide con la de la razón.

The problem of the relation of logic, the theory of knowledge, and dialectics occupied a special place in Lenin’s work. One can say, without danger of exaggeration, that it forms the core of all his special philosophical reflections, to which he returned again and again, each time formulating his conception and solution more succinctly and categorically. Although the direct object of the critical analysis documented in the Philosophical Notebooks was first and foremost G. W. F. Hegel’s conception, it would of course be a mistake to see in that book only a critical commentary on Hegel’s works. Lenin was concerned, it goes without saying, not with Hegel as such but with the real content of problems that still preserve their urgent significance to this day. In other words, Lenin undertook, in the form of a critical analysis of the Hegelian conception, a survey of the state of affairs in philosophy in his own day, comparing and evaluating the means of posing and resolving its cardinal problems.

The Frauchiger-Renner Paradox is an extension of paradoxes based on the ‘Problem of Measurement,’ such as Schrodinger’s Cat and Wigner’s Friend. All of these paradoxes stem from assuming that quantum theory has only unitary (linear) physical dynamics, and the attendant ambiguity about what counts as a ‘measurement’–i.e., the inability to account for the observation of determinate measurement outcomes from within the theory itself. This paper discusses a basic inconsistency arising in the FR scenario at a much earlier point than the derived contradiction: namely, the inconsistency inherent in treating an improper mixture (reduced density operator) as a proper, epistemic mixture.