Este ensayo se centra en un breve pero significativo pasaje de Physics, IV 13, 222a28-b7, en el que Aristóteles provee dos argumentos a favor de la infinitud extensiva del tiempo. El primero, argumenta Vigo, presenta su infinitud extensiva como dependiente de la infinitud del movimiento. El segundo argumento , en cambio, procede inmanentemente a partir de la consideración de las propiedades que el ‘ahora’ posee como límite que da cuenta tanto de la posibilidad de la delimitación (divisibilidad) como de la continuidad del tiempo. El artículo también examina algunas consecuencias sistemáticas de este último argumento e intenta aclarar algunos acertijos que involucra desde el punto de vista metodológico. Tales dificultades subrayan algunos limites estructurales del intento de Aristóteles por llevar a cabo un tratamiento re(con)ductivo de las propiedades del tiempo consideradas como un modo del continuum dependiente de otros dos dominios mis básicos: el movimiento y la magnitud espacialmente extensa

La doctrina de la Idea, en el final de la Ciencia de la Lógica, se sirve de la noción de «espíritu» para explicar la naturaleza de la Idea misma, cuyas determinaciones lógicas son, a su vez, las determinaciones de lo espiritual. Nos proponemos mostrar en qué medida los pasajes de la doctrina de la Idea referidos al «espíritu» están lejos de poseer un significado episódico.

In this paper we address the relativist-perspectival nature of the orthodox definition of quantum entanglement in terms of preferred factorizations. We also consider this aspect aspect within the generalized definition of entanglement proposed by Barnum et al. [6, 7] in terms of preferred observables. More specifically, we will discuss the non-separable relativism implied by the orthodox definition of entanglement, the contextual relativism implied by its generalization as well as some other serious problems presently discussed within the specialized literature.

If the Past Hypothesis underlies the arrows of time, what is the status of the Past Hypothesis? In this paper, I examine the role of the Past Hypothesis in the Boltzmannian account and defend the view that the Past Hypothesis is a candidate fundamental law of nature. Such a view is known to be compatible with Humeanism about laws, but as I argue it is also supported by a minimal non-Humean «governing» view. Some worries arise from the non-dynamical and time-dependent character of the Past Hypothesis as a boundary condition, the intrinsic vagueness in its specification, and the nature of the initial probability distribution.

In the year 2000, in a paper titled Quantum Theory Needs No ‘Interpretation’, Chris Fuchs and Asher Peres presented a series of instrumentalist arguments against the role played by ‘interpretations’ in QM. Since then –quite regardless of the publication of this paper– the number of interpretations has experienced a continuous growth constituting what Adan Cabello has characterized as a «map of madness». In this work, we discuss the reasons behind this dangerous fragmentation in understanding and provide new arguments against the need of interpretations in QM which –opposite to those of Fuchs and Peres– are derived from a representational realist understanding of theories –grounded in the writings of Einstein, Heisenberg and Pauli.

Probability is virtually ubiquitous. It plays a role in almost all the sciences. It underpins much of the social sciences — witness the prevalent use of statistical testing, confidence intervals, regression methods, and so on. It finds its way, moreover, into much of philosophy. In epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and cognitive science, we see states of opinion being modeled by subjective probability functions, and learning being modeled by the updating of such functions. Since probability theory is central to decision theory and game theory, it has ramifications for ethics and political philosophy. It figures prominently in such staples of metaphysics as causation and laws of nature. It appears again in the philosophy of science in the analysis of confirmation of theories, scientific explanation, and in the philosophy of specific scientific theories, such as quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics, evolutionary biology, and genetics. It can even take center stage in the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of religion. Thus, problems in the foundations of probability bear at least indirectly, and sometimes directly, upon central scientific, social scientific, and philosophical concerns. The interpretation of probability is one of the most important such foundational problems.

In the last two decades, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the question of probability and uncertainty in Keynes’s General Theory by a group often referred to as the ‘Post-Keynesians’. As I will be making a good deal of use of the researches of this group in the present paper, I will begin by saying a little in general terms about the group and its ideas. After the second world war, Keynesian economics became dominant in the British academic community, and British governments to a large extent followed the advice of Keynesian economists.

En da Costa y de Ronde (2013) discutimos la posibilidad de considerar a las superposiciones cuánticas en términos de un enfoque paraconsistente. Argumentamos que, si bien la mayoría de las interpretaciones de la mecánica cuántica intenta escapar a las contradicciones, existen varias razones que indican la importancia de considerar un enfoque de este tipo. Recientemente, Arenhart y Krause (2016) han presentado numerosos argumentos en contra del enfoque paraconsistente a las superposiciones cuánticas. En este trabajo intentaré responder a las preguntas y obstáculos presentados por ellos.

In this work we attempt to confront the orthodox widespread claim present in the foundational literature of Quantum Mechanics (QM) according to which ‘superpositions are never actually observed in the lab’. In order to do so, we begin by providing a critical analysis of the famous measurement problem which, we will argue, was originated by the strict application of the empirical-positivist requirements to subsume the quantum formalism under their specific understanding of ‘theory’. In this context, the ad hoc introduction of the projection postulate (or measurement rule) can be understood as a necessary requirement coming from a naive empiricist standpoint which presupposes that observations are self evident givens of «common sense» experience –independent of metaphysical (categorical) presuppositions.

Tuve una reunión muy interesante. Fue una reunión con el mismo Shakhnazarov, quien escribió en el año 85 o 86 el artículo «La administración de la comunidad mundial». Fue asesor de Gorbachov y uno de los teóricos de la Perestroika. Conociendo mi posición patriótica desde hace mucho tiempo, Gordon, cuando estaba conduciendo un programa en el Canal Uno con Solovyov, me invitó a defender los intereses de los conservadores rusos patrióticos contra sus enemigos.