truth values and proof theory

Por • 3 ene, 2022 • Sección: Opinion

Greg Restall

 In this paper I present an account of truth values for classical logicintuitionistic logic, and the modal logic S5, in which truth values are not a fundamental category from which the logic is defined, but rather, feature as an idealisation of more fundamental logical features arising out of the proof theory for each system. The result is not a new set of semantic structures, but a new understanding of how the existing semantic structures may be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion of logical consequence.

“Truth Values and Proof Theory,” Studia Logica, 92:2 (2009) 241–264.



I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. ¶ I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews.

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