Power Accretion in Social Systems

Por • 12 feb, 2019 • Sección: sociologia

Silvia N. SantallaKostadin KoroutchevElka KorutchevaJavier Rodriguez-Laguna

We consider a model of power distribution in a social system where a set of agents play a simple game: the probability of winning each round is proportional to the agent’s current power, and the winner gets more power as a result. We show that inequality grows naturally up to a certain stationary value characterized by a sharp difference between a higher and a lower class of agents, where the latter can not call the bets placed by the former. High class agents are separated by one or several lower class agents which serve as a geometrical barrier preventing further flow of power between them. Moreover, we consider the effect of redistributive mechanisms, such as proportional (non-progressive) taxation. Sufficient taxation will induce a phase transition towards a more equal society, but an insufficient tax level may have counterintuitive effects in the inequality level, since it may reduce the effectivity of the geometric barriers preventing accretion.

arXiv:1902.03288v1 [physics.soc-ph]

Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph); Statistical Mechanics (cond-mat.stat-mech)

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