The analysis of the arguments within the limits of the classical thermodynamics that lead to the Gibbs paradox was made. Features of preconditions used in the derivation of the entropy of mixing of ideal gases that caused the appearance of paradox were established. It was shown that the Gibbs paradox has not connection with the assumption of discrete differences between the parameters of different gases.

First, we show that there exists in classical mechanics three actions corresponding to different boundary conditions: two well-known actions, the Euler-Lagrange classical action S_cl(x,t;x_0), which links the initial position x_0 and its position x at time t, the Hamilton-Jacobi action S(x,t), which links a family of particles of initial action S_0(x) to their various positions x at time t, and a new action, the deterministic action S(x,t;x_0,v_0), which links a particle in initial position x_0 and initial velocity v_0 to its position x at time t. We study, in the semi-classical approximation, the convergence of the quantum density and the quantum action, solutions to the Madelung equations, when the Planck constant h tends to 0. We find two different solutions which depend on the initial density.

Bohmian mechanics allows us to understand quantum systems in the light of other quantum traits than the well-known ones (coherence, diffraction, interference, tunneling, discreteness, entanglement, etc.). Here the discussion focusses precisely on two of these interesting aspects, which arise when quantum mechanics is though within this theoretical framework: the non-crossing property, which allows for distinguishability without erasing interference patterns, and the possibility to define quantum probability tubes, along which the probability remains constant all the way. Furthermore, taking into account this hydrodynamic-like description as a link, it is also shown how this knowledge (concepts and ideas) can be straightforwardly transferred to other fields of physics (for example, the transmission of light along waveguides).

Since the appearance of General Relativity, its intrinsec general covariance has been very often misinterpreted as implying that physically meaningful quantitities (and conclusions extracted from the theory) have to be absolutely independent on observers. This incorrect point of view is sometimes expressed by discarding the very concept of observer in the structure and applications of the theory. As we shall stress in this essay, through some examples, the concept of observer is as essential to General Relativity as it is to any physical theory.