During the “long decade” of transformation of mathematical physics between 1915 and 1930, H. Weyl interacted with physics in two highly productive phases and contributed to it, among others, by his widely read book on Space – Time – Matter (Raum- Zeit – Materie), (1918-1923) and on Group Theory and Quantum Mechanics (Gruppentheorie und Quantenmechanik) (1928-1931). In this time Weyl’s understanding of the constitution of matter and its mathematical description changed considerably. At the beginning of the period he started from a “dynamistic” and geometrical conception of matter, following and extending the Mie-Hilbert approch, which he gave up during the year 1920. After transitional experiments with a singularity (and in this sense topological) approach in 1921/22, he developed an open perspective of what he called an “agency theory” of matter. The idea for it was formulated already before the advent of the “new” quantum mechanics in 1925/26.

El indeterminismo cuántico parece incompatible con la defensa de la causalidad que hace Kant en su Segunda Analogía. La interpretación de Copenhague de la mecánica cuántica también considera a esta teoría como evidencia, a favor del antirealismo. Este articulo defiende que la ley (trascendental) de la causalidad se aplica solamente al mundo en tanto que observable, y no a objetos hipotéticos (inobservables) como los quarks, detectables solo mediante aceleradores de altas energías. Tomar la constante de Planck y la velocidad de la luz como límites inferior y superior de la observabilidad nos ofrece un modo de interpretar los observables de la mecánica cuántica como empíricamente reales, incluso aunque estos sean trascendentalmente, es decir, preobservacionalmente, ideales.

Argumentamos que la teoría cuántica no admite una generalización de la noción clásica de probabilidad condicionada. Mostramos que la probabilidad definida por la regla de Lüders, interpretada generalmente como la regla de condicionalización mecánico-cuántica, no puede ser interpretada como tal.

The science of thermodynamics was put together in the Nineteenth Century to describe large systems in equilibrium. One part of thermodynamics defines entropy for equilibrium systems and demands an ever-increasing entropy for non-equilibrium ones. However, starting with the work of Ludwig Boltzmann in 1872, and continuing to the present day, various models of non-equilibrium behavior have been put together with the specific aim of generalizing the concept of entropy to non-equilibrium situations. This kind of entropy has been termed {\em kinetic entropy} to distinguish it from the thermodynamic variety. Knowledge of kinetic entropy started from Boltzmann’s insight about his equation for the time dependence of gaseous systems. In this paper, his result is stated as a definition of kinetic entropy in terms of a local equation for the entropy density. This definition is then applied to Landau’s theory of the Fermi liquid thereby giving the kinetic entropy within that theory.

An attempt is made to give a heuristic explanation of the distinguished role of measurement in the quantum theory. We question the notion of “naive” reductionism by stressing the difference between an isolated quantum and classical object. It is argued that the transition from the micro- to the macroscopic description should be made along some parameters not characterized by the quantum theory.

The aim of this paper is to elaborate a notion of explanation which is applicable to stochastic processes such as quantum processes. The model-theoretic approach was adopted in order to delimit appropriate classes, by defining set-theoretical predicates, of different kinds of physical transformations that quantum systems suffer, either of transitions or of transmutations, by interaction or in a spontaneous manner. To explain a singular quantum process consists in showing that it is feasible to model it as an indeterministic process of certain specified kind.

In 1963-71, a group of people, myself included, formulated and perfected a new approach to physics problems, which eventually came to be known under the names of scaling, universality, and renormalization. This work formed the basis of a wide variety of theories ranging from its starting point in critical phenomena, and moving out to particle physics and relativity and then into economics and biology. This work was of transcendental beauty and of considerable intellectual importance.

In recent literature, it has become clear that quantum physics does not refute Humeanism. This point has so far been made with respect to Bohms quantum theory. Against this background, this paper seeks to achieve the following four results: to generalize the option of quantum Humeanism from Bohmian mechanics to primitive ontology theories in general, to show that this option applies also to classical mechanics, to establish that it requires a commitment to matter as primitive stuff, but no commitment to natural properties (physicalism without properties, to point out that by removing the commitment to properties, the stock metaphysical objections against Humeanism from quidditism and humility no longer apply. In that way, quantum physics strengthens Humeanism instead of refuting it.

Este artículo explora los artilugios conceptuales que utiliza la teoría de Bruno Latour para comprender y explicar la realidad natural y social. Asimismo, se exponen cuáles son los límites a su principio de “indeterminación radical” o principio de simetría generalizado. Este análisis muestra la posibilidad de un estudio normativo de la realidad social y tecnocientífica compatible con la evolución que se encuentra en el mismo Latour respecto del significado y función políticos de la ciencia.

The theoretical solid-state physicist Walter Kohn was awarded one-half of the 1998 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his mid-1960’s creation of an approach to the many-particle problem in quantum mechanics called density functional theory (DFT). In its exact form, DFT establishes that the total charge density of any system of electrons and nuclei provides all the information needed for a complete description of that system. This was a breakthrough for the study of atoms, molecules, gases, liquids, and solids. Before DFT, it was thought that only the vastly more complicated many-electron wave function was needed for a complete description of such systems. Today, fifty years after its introduction, DFT (in one of its approximate forms) is the method of choice used by most scientists to calculate the physical properties of materials of all kinds. In this paper, I present a biographical essay of Kohn’s educational experiences and professional career up to and including the creation of DFT.